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ACCOUNTABILITY IN REGULATORY REFORM: 
AUSTRALIA’S SUPERANNUATION INDUSTRY PARADOX 
Sue Taylor,* Anthony Asher** and Julie Anne Tarr*** 
ABSTRACT 
The Australian Superannuation Industry is generally seen as very strong and successful 
by global standards. However, three decades of legislative reform in the Australian 
superannuation industry have created a paradox: ongoing reforms but continuing 
dissatisfaction with areas of governance and outcomes. These include high levels of 
administrative and investment fees, and systematic problems around a culture of 
conflicted investment advice. 
In seeking to further elaborate and then resolve this paradox, this article draws upon 
an extensive research project conducted by the authors within the Australian 
superannuation industry, including three voluntary and anonymous surveys of 
superannuation trustees/licensees. This research has revealed that fund members are 
vulnerable to significant and expanding private-interest rents generated by the financial 
services sector. This may be explained by regulatory capture mechanisms variously 
described as statutory, agency, corrosive and intellectual capture. 
The article examines ways to better achieve public interest outcomes, and at a time 
when public sector integrity remains an area of particular attention, how more can be 
done to blunt the force of private interest rent seeking. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Until 1983, occupational superannuation played only a peripheral role in securing 
retirement savings for Australia’s workforce with less than 40% of employees 
contributing to superannuation schemes. By June 2016,1 $2.1 trillion in superannuation 
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assets covered 91% of Australians.2 The increase can be largely ascribed to policies 
introduced by the Hawke/Keating Federal Labor Government (1983–1991). 
The Australian Superannuation Industry dominates its capital markets with a pool 
of funds which equates to 126% of Australia’s annual GDP3 and 120% of Australia’s 
share market capitalisation where superannuation funds, as the dominant investors, 
hold half the value of all listed shares.4 It continues to experience one of the world’s 
highest pension fund growth rates with a compound annual growth rate of almost seven 
per cent between 2006 and 2016 (in US$ terms). This rate was well above the global 
average of four per cent over the same period.5 
Given the preferred status of superannuation as a savings vehicle (together with 
housing), and its placement as a primary pillar of Australia’s national retirement income 
strategy, it is not surprising that it has, on public interest grounds, attracted high levels 
of regulatory reform interventions over the last three decades. These interventions 
however appear not to have addressed all major issues with governance and outcomes, 
giving rise to a paradox of ongoing reforms, relatively uneven results and, in some 
respects, high levels of dissatisfaction. We suggest in this article that the paradox results 
from elements of regulatory capture with narrow industry interests favoured at the 
expense of the public and then outline certain integrated, mitigating strategies designed 
to redress this imbalance. 
Based on Part II’s description of the industry and the regulatory changes over the 
past three decades, Part III begins with the findings of an original three-stage research 
project which sought the views of Australia’s superannuation fund trustees across a 
nine-year period as to their views of the cost and benefits of reforms introduced during 
this period. It then considers how regulatory reforms have failed to address excess costs 
and conflicted payments within the superannuation industry and how this might be 
explained by regulatory capture.  
Part IV then considers a strategy designed to mitigate the risk of capture by 
subjecting the regulatory process to greater external scrutiny in the form of an 
appropriate cost benefit analysis (CBA). It describes Australia’s current Regulatory 
Impact Statement (RIS) process, and the extent to which the regulatory reforms 
introduced in the superannuation industry may have been undermined by weak-form 
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RISs deriving from the use of various statutory exemptions. Recommendations are 
provided as to how the RIS process, when used in conjunction with related measures 
designed to strengthen the position of the ‘public’ interests (eg diffuse, superannuation 
fund members), could potentially constitute a mechanism to create order, transparency 
and discipline in the regulatory reform process—and, in so doing, better enable fund 
members to detect and reject illegitimate rent seeking activities. 
II SUPERANNUATION AND REGULATION 
This section describes the industry and its regulatory history. 
A The Superannuation Industry 
We define the Superannuation Industry as the Superannuation funds registered under 
the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) (‘SIS Act’). Funds are usually 
‘employer-sponsored’ and may be ‘public offer’ if membership is open.6 Mandatory 
contributions, together sometimes with additional ‘salary sacrifice’, are made largely by 
employers but there is also provision for contributions by the self-employed. The 
benefits paid are restricted by the ‘sole purpose test’ to benefits after retirement or the 
death of a member.7 
Superannuation funds are trusts, controlled by trustees, who may act in their 
individual capacity or be directors of a company. Part 6 of the SIS Act sets out fiduciary 
duties largely in line with the general law, although section 58B specifically exempts the 
fund from the conflict of interest provisions of the general law with respect to investing 
and acquiring financial services.  
Serving the industry are a range of producer organisations within the Financial 
Service Sector (FSS): administrators, asset managers, custodians, banks, insurance 
companies, financial advisors, actuaries, lawyers and accountants.8  
The typical superannuation fund, then, is not a discrete commercial entity, such as is 
commonly the case with a bank or insurance company in which core functions are 
vertically and horizontally integrated. It is rather a collection of disparate entities, selected, 
directed and monitored centrally by the trustee. 9  
The industry is commonly divided10 into ‘Retail’ funds which are run for commercial 
purposes, and which account for 26% of assets and 45% of members; ‘Industry’ funds 
where the trustees are jointly appointed by trade unions and employers within an 
industry although largely controlled by the former (22% of assets and 38% of members); 
‘Corporate’ and ‘Public Sector’ funds, which are controlled by single employers or 
groups (19% of assets and 13% of members) and Self-managed superannuation funds 
                                                                                                                                                              
6  These are defined in the SIS Act ss 16–18. 
7  SIS Act s 62. 
8  Kevin Davis, ‘Financial reform in Australia’ in Maximilian Hall (ed), The International 
Handbook on Financial Reform (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham UK, 2003), 1–30. 
9  Scott Donald et al, ‘Too connected to fail: the regulation of systemic risk within Australia’s 
superannuation system’ (2016) 2 Journal of Financial Regulation 56–78, 62. 
10  APRA, Annual Superannuation Bulletin (June 2016) 
<http://www.apra.gov.au/Super/Publications/Documents/2017ASBEXCEL201606%20-
%20PDF.pdf> 11.  
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(SMSFs), which have fewer than five members all of whom are trustees (30% of assets 
and 4% of members). All but the Retail funds are, ostensibly, ‘not for profit’. 
The majority of the for-profit (retail) superannuation funds are operated by entities 
owned by the four largest banks in Australia (i.e., the NAB, ANZ, Westpac and the 
Commonwealth). In 2016, these four accounted for 88% of Australian banking system 
assets11 the profits of which equated to 2.9 per cent of GDP; their size and return on 
capital making them the most profitable in the world.12 The FSS is Australia’s largest 
industry larger than mining and manufacturing … one of the largest employers in the 
country, employing 416,500 people … Over the 2015-16 financial year, the financial services 
sector directly contributed $145.8 billion of economic activity … approximately $6,000 for 
every man, women and child in Australia. That equates to financial services growing by 4.3 
per cent – over one and a half times faster than the rate of GDP.13 
Within this context, of primary interest to this analysis are the lobby groups who 
operate within the FSS which have direct links to the superannuation industry. Firstly, 
the Australian Bankers’ Association (ABA) includes all of the major retail banks in 
Australia, some investment banks and some foreign banks. ‘The ABA works on behalf 
of members to ensure customers continue to benefit from a stable, competitive and 
accessible banking industry’ 14 . Second, the interests of the fund management 
institutions15 are represented by the Financial Services Council (FSC), whose mission 
includes ‘continuously engaging in advocacy concerning the development of the social, 
economic and regulatory framework in which our members operate, thereby helping 
them to better serve their clients and customers.’16 
Their advocacy can sometimes be contrasted with the views of the Australian 
Institute of Superannuation Trustees (AIST), the ‘principal advocate and peak 
representative body for the $700 billion profit-to-member superannuation sector’17 and 
the Australian Superannuation Funds Association, the ‘peak policy, research and 
                                                                                                                                                              
11   Mamiza Haq and Necmi K Avkiran, ‘Company results wrap: weighing up the risks behind 
the profits of Australia’s big four banks, The Conversation 9 September 2016 
<https://theconversation.com/company-results-wrap-weighing-up-the-risks-behind-the-
profits-of-australias-big-four-banks-63396>. 
12  2015 figures compiled by The Banker and released by The Australia Institute, as reported in 
Michael Janda, ‘Australian Banks are Too Big for the Nation’s Good’, ABC News (online), 31 
August 2016 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-31/janda-aus-banks-are-too-
big/7789830>.  
13  Financial Services Council and UB Asset Management, State of the Industry Report ( 2017) 
Financial Services Council <https://www.fsc.org.au/_entity/annotation/e4439f6c-c103-
e711-80d3-00155dea4d00><. 
14  Australian Bankers Association, About Us, Doing it Tough? 
<http://www.doingittough.info/About-ABA/About-ABA>. 
15  That is, Australia’s retail and wholesale funds management businesses, superannuation 
funds, life insurers, financial advisory networks and licensed trustee companies, Financial 
Services Council <http://www.fsc.org.au/>. 
16  Financial Services Council, About the Financial Services Council (2017) 
<http://www.fsc.org.au/about-us/about-the-financial-services-council.aspx>.  
17  Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, Who are we? (2017) 
<http://www.aist.asn.au/about/who-are-we.aspx>. 
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advocacy body for Australia’s superannuation industry,’18 with representatives from 
the majority of the larger funds. 
B Reforms to the Regulatory Landscape 
The mandatory occupational superannuation benefits scheme was, when introduced, 
positioned ‘as amongst the finest achievements of the … reformist ALP Government.’19 
Increased retirement savings levels derived from mandatory contributions would help 
advance national savings goals; superannuation-based savings in turn would enable 
Australia’s economy to grow without building unsustainable foreign debt;20 and this 
‘coherent and equitable framework’ would permit a higher standard of living in 
retirement. Legislation needed to achieve this objective included extension of 
occupational superannuation benefits to all employees under the Superannuation 
Guarantee Charge Act 1992 (Cth) (‘SGC Act’). Immediately following this extension of 
coverage, regulatory reforms began with the enactment of the SIS Act and its 
Regulations in 1993 and 1994, which continue as pillars of the superannuation system. 
The Howard Coalition government’s arrival in 1996 first brought with it a change in 
the regulatory architecture driven by the concerns of the Wallis Report21 in respect of 
banks and insurers. Since 1998, therefore, the industry has been subject to oversight by 
three regulators: 
All superannuation entities are regulated by the Australian Tax Office (ATO) to 
ensure compliance with tax legislation. 
 All funds, except the SMSFs are regulated by APRA, which is responsible for 
the administration of undefined ‘retirement income standards’ in terms of the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (Cth). Section 8(2) of this Act 
requires APRA, inter alia to balance ‘financial safety and efficiency’, and is 
particularly concerned with ensuring fiduciary responsibility by trustees and 
that beneficiaries reasonable expectations are met. 
 The Australian Securities and Investments and Commission (ASIC) regulates 
‘market integrity and consumer protection’ of financial service providers and 
the funds (again except SMSFs). This incorporates governance and financial 
product disclosure as covered by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Corps Act’). 
                                                                                                                                                              
18  Australian Superannuation Funds Association < https://www.superannuation.asn.au/>. 
19  Fred Gruen and Michelle Grattan, Managing Government: Labor’s achievements & failures 
(Longman Cheshire, 1993) 7. 
20  John Dawkins, ‘Security in Retirement—Planning for tomorrow today’, Statement by the 
Honourable John Dawkins MP, Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia, 30 June 1992, 
1-33; Michael E Drew and John D Stanford, ‘A Review of Australia’s Compulsory 
Superannuation Scheme After a Decade’ (Discussion Paper No 322, University of 
Queensland School of Economics, 2003) 4.  
21  Department of the Treasury, Financial System Inquiry, Final Report (March 1997) < 
http://fsi.treasury.gov.au/content/FinalReport.asp >. 
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Each are responsible for different sections of the SIS Act.22 All three operate with 
some independence23 and have the power to make subordinate legislation24. These 
include APRA’s Prudential Standards and ASIC’s Class Orders. The SIS Act also permits 
the Treasury to make regulations, another form of subordinate legislation. APRA enjoys 
slightly more independence given that its governing members are appointed, in terms 
of its Act, by Parliament rather than on the recommendation of the Treasurer. The 
demarcation between the roles of ASIC and APRA is not always clear,25 and both, in any 
event, have to engage with the Treasury in any regulatory reform and are effectively 
involved in member protection. 
A further trilogy of licensing and fund choice reforms occurred early in the new 
century. Initially, the Financial Sector Reform Act 2001 (Cth) (‘FRSA’) introduced licensing 
and other requirements by ASIC for service and product providers. These were designed 
to harmonise financial services sector products and distribution to ‘facilitate innovation 
and promote business, while at the same time ensuring adequate levels of consumer 
protection and market integrity.’26  
The Superannuation Safety Amendment Act 2004 (Cth) then introduced measures 
aimed at enhancing ‘safety, competition and a best practice environment’ for non-SMSF 
funds. Central to these Registrable Superannuation Entity (RSE) reforms was formal 
licensing of both trustees and funds by APRA. Described ‘as the catalyst for far-reaching 
change,’ APRA viewed these licensing requirements as necessary given that: 
the compulsory nature of superannuation means that the failure of the market to deliver 
optimal outcomes for superannuation impacts on almost all superannuation fund 
members. In a system of mandatory retirement savings where members must be part of 
the system, RSE licensees and superannuation regulators have an increasing obligation to 
ensure that confidence in the system is maintained.27 
One consequence, as predicted by Clare, was that licensing would ‘undoubtedly 
impact on individuals in those [exiting] funds, and, in some instances, force well run 
funds to exit and reduce the diversity within the industry.’ 28Statistics supported this 
prediction with the number of RSE funds with more than 4 members calculated to have 
decreased by 94% from 3,661 in June 2001 to 236 in June 2016.29  
                                                                                                                                                              
22  See SIS Act s 6. 
23  They are all listed entities under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 
2013 (Cth) s 12. 
24  Powers are granted under the SIS Act (APRA and the ATO) and the Corps Act (ASIC) to 
make ‘Legislative instruments’ under the Legislation Act 2003 (Cth).  
25  See, eg, Greg Medcraft, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, ‘Speech to 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority leadership team’ (Speech delivered at the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority leadership team meeting, 30 June 2011) 
<http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1347368/Speech-to-APRA-leadership-team-1.pdf>. 
26  Explanatory Memorandum, Financial Services Reform Bill (Cth) 2001 < 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/fsrb2001252/memo1.html>. 
27  APRA, ‘Regulation Impact Statement – Superannuation Prudential Standards’, 2012, 
<http://www.apra.gov.au/Policy/Documents/Prudential-Standards-RIS.pdf>, 3-4. 
28  R Clare, ‘Benefits and costs of the Regulation of Superannuation’, (Presented to ASFA 
National Conference and Super Expo ‘Going the Distance’, Perth Convention Centre, April 
2007), 6. 
29  Calculated from the APRA Annual Report 2001, 11 and APRA Annual Report 2016, 30. 
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Labor’s re-election in 2007 brought further superannuation regulatory reforms. The 
Australian Super System Review (the Cooper Review) was commissioned:30 
to assess whether Australia’s compulsory retirement saving system was working 
efficiently and in member interests. The broad-ranging Review looked at the underlying 
philosophy of a compulsory system that is almost entirely outsourced to the private sector. 
A key conclusion of the Review was that the system needs to be re-engineered to work 
more for the benefit of its members … reducing costs should be a top priority.31 
Arising from Review recommendations, ‘Stronger Super’ was introduced32  with 
‘MySuper’, a simple, low cost default superannuation product and ‘Superstream’ that 
enforces uniform processing standards to make transactions cheaper and faster. APRA 
was also provided with a mandate to establish and enforce prudential standards and 
practices through amendments to the SIS Act. Stronger Super was also intended to 
increase cost disclosure, and ASIC has made progress in this direction over the 
intervening decade culminating in March 2017 by the issue of ‘RG 97 Disclosing fees and 
costs in PDSs and periodic statements’.33  
Arrival in 2012 of the Future of Financial Advice reforms (FOFA reforms) brought 
another reform wave. These reforms were developed by the Labor Government in 
response to a series of high profile corporate collapses occasioning losses to fund 
members of $6 billion including Great Southern, Westpoint, Opes Prime, Trio and Storm 
Financial. The original Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) package of legislation was 
contained in two Acts34 that amended the Corps Act and introduced a prospective ban 
on conflicted remuneration structures; a duty for financial advisers to act in the best 
interests of their clients; an opt-in obligation that requires advice providers to renew 
their clients’ agreement to ongoing fees every two years; and an annual fee disclosure 
statement requirement. Enhanced powers were granted to the ASIC35 and compliance 
with the FOFA reforms was mandatory from 1 July 2013.36 
However, on 19 March 2014 the returning, Australian Coalition Government 
introduced the Corporations Amendment (Streamlining of Future Financial Advice) Bill 2014 
                                                                                                                                                              
30  Attorney-General’s Department, Stronger Super, Government’s Response to the Australian 
Super System Review, 2010, 1. 
31  Jeremy Cooper, ‘Super for Members: A New Paradigm for Australia’s Retirement Income 
System’ (2010) 3 Rotman International Journal of Pension Management, 8, 8. 
32  Attorney-General’s Department, above n 30, 7. 
33  Australian Securities and Investment Commission, Regulatory Guide 97 (March 2017) 
<http://download.asic.gov.au/media/4200654/rg97-published-29-march-2017.pdf>. 
34  These reforms were introduced through the Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial 
Advice) Act 2012 (Cth) and the Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice 
Measures) Act 2012 (Cth), (‘the FOFA Acts’) which amended the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
35  As elaborated by the ASIC, FOFA—Guidance, and including Regulatory Guide 98 Licensing; 
Administrative action against financial services providers (RG 98) which reflected the 
ASIC’s expanded powers to cancel or suspend an AFS licence and ban representatives; 
ASIC, FOFA – ASIC Guidance (20 October 2014) <http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-
resources/financial-services/future-of-financial-advice-reforms/fofa-asic-
guidance/#powers>. 
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(‘the Bill’) into Parliament that outlined the a series of changes to the FoFA reforms 
including: removal of the ‘catch-all’ element of the ‘safe harbour’ for the best interests 
duty and further amendments to the best interests duty to facilitate scaled advice; 
removal of the requirement for fee disclosure statements to be sent to pre-1 July 2013 
clients; removal of the opt-in obligation for ongoing fee arrangements entered into after 
the commencement of the Amendment Regulations, and exempting general advice from 
conflicted remuneration in some circumstances.37 
The Streamlining FOFA Regulation was disallowed by the Senate on 19 November 
2014, meaning that the FOFA provisions reverted back to their position prior to the 
commencement of the Streamlining FOFA Regulation. A number of these regulations 
were reinstated by the Corporations Amendment (Revising Future of Financial Advice) 
Regulation 2014 (Cth), which commenced on 16 December 2014. The SOA Regulation was 
repealed on 16 December 2014 by the Corporations (Statements of Advice) Repeal Regulation 
2014. On 2 March 2016, the Bill (renamed the Corporations Amendment (Financial Advice 
Measures) Bill) was passed by the Parliament. The Bill made a number of amendments, 
including extending the time period for giving opt-in notices and fee disclosure 
statements from 30 days after the relevant date to 60 days after the relevant date.38 These 
events and the current requirements of the FOFA reforms following the successful 2016 
regulatory amendments are discussed in more detail in Part III of this article, along with 
a summary of the position of the major interest groups.  
Two further superannuation system reviews were initiated by the Coalition 
Government. The 2013 ‘Better Regulation’39  repeated proposals that boards should 
include one third independent directors, various transparency measures intended to 
enhance member understanding of investment risks and asset holdings, and possible 
changes to the determination of default funds in industrial awards. The transparency 
measures have been legislated through changes to the Corps Act40 but are not yet in force 
and the other measures are still subject to partisan debate. The 2014 Financial System 
Inquiry Final Report 41 found that, although Australia’s financial system had many 
strong characteristics, ‘superannuation is not delivering retirement incomes efficiently 
… unfair consumer outcomes remain prevalent … and policy settings do not focus on 
the benefits of competition and innovation. As a result, the system is prone to calls for 
more regulation.’42 Their approach was informed by the view that ‘the superannuation 
                                                                                                                                                              
37  Most of these changes were implemented through the Corporations Amendment (Streamlining 
Future of Financial Advice) Regulation 2014 (the Streamlining FOFA Regulation) which 
commenced on 1 July 2014. Changes to the Statement of Advice (SOA) requirements were 
also implemented through the Corporations Amendment (Statements of Advice) Regulation 2014 
(‘SOA Regulation’), which was to commence on 1 January 2015. 
38  ASIC, FOFA - Background and Implementation, above n 36. 
39  Department of the Treasury, Better regulation and governance, enhanced transparency and 
improved competition in superannuation, Discussion Paper 28 (November 2013) 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2013/Better-
regulation-and-governance>. 
40  Corps Act ss 1017BA; 1017BB. 
41  Australian Government, Financial System Inquiry, Final Report: Executive Summary (2014), 
xviii. 
42  Ibid xiii.  
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system is not operationally efficient due to a lack of strong price-based competition,’43 
and their recommendations, not yet implemented, were to give regulators enhanced 
powers to increase competition and transparency. Somewhat surprisingly, given its 
scope, there is no mention of the possibility of regulatory capture,44 which we suggest, 
in Part III, lies at the root of the paradox. 
In 2016, the Australian Government Productivity Commission (PC) also announced 
a study to develop criteria to assess the efficiency and competitiveness of the 
superannuation system, and an inquiry to develop alternative models for a formal 
competitive process for allocating default fund members to products. Both tasks will 
inform a further review of the efficiency and competitiveness of the superannuation 
system in 2017.45 
In spite of all this, while the ongoing reform process has resulted in a range of benefits 
including increasing retirement incomes, member choice, and the funding of Australia’s 
economy,46 ‘… more needs to be done to reduce fees and improve after-fee returns for 
fund members.’47 As the PC observed:  
Regulation has grown at an unprecedented pace in Australia over recent decades … 
[while] this regulatory accretion has brought economic, social and environmental benefits. 
… it has also brought substantial costs. Some costs have been the unavoidable by product 
of pursuing legitimate policy objectives. But a significant proportion has not. And in some 
cases, the costs have exceeded the benefits. Moreover, regulations have not always been 
effective in addressing the objectives for which they were designed… 48 
III REGULATORY FAILURES 
It seems that, at the heart of the issue, policy and regulatory incursions, as a result of extensive 
lobbying, and various forms of regulatory capture, have better served the private interests of the 
FSS than members. The trillion-dollar mandatory stream of superannuation contributions is a 
financial windfall for these producers. Not only does this compulsory revenue pool provide 
guaranteed growth in superannuation revenue inflows, it simultaneously minimizes the threat of 
terminations, surrenders and forfeitures which caused critical issues of concern in the pre-
                                                                                                                                                              
43  Ibid xviii. 
44  The issue was however raised forcefully in at least one submission to the Inquiry. See The 
Australia Institute, Submission to The Financial Services Review (March 2014) 
<http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/04/The_Australia_Institute.pdf>. The absence of comment 
in the Inquiry also did not entirely escape notice at the time: see UNSW Centre for Law 
Markets and Regulation, Innovating Regulatory Capture (9 December 2014) 
<https://clmr.unsw.edu.au/article//innovating-regulatory-capture>. 
45  Productivity Commission, How to Assess the Competitiveness and Efficiency of the 
Superannuation System - Study Report (2016) 
<http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/current/superannuation/competitiveness-
efficiency/report>. 
46  Australian Government, Financial System Inquiry - Interim Report (2014), ch 4.  
47  Productivity Commission, How to Assess the Competitiveness and Efficiency of the 
Superannuation System, above n 45, iv.  
48  Productivity Commission, Identifying and Evaluating Regulation Reforms - Research Report 
(2011) xi. 
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mandated regime.49 In many instances, regulatory processes have not only been ineffective, but 
have served to distract from more important questions often creating burdens and obstacles to 
better governance and effectiveness. 
This Part first provides evidence of some of these regulatory failures, and then shows how 
theories of regulatory capture can offer an explanation. 
A Evidence of Regulatory Failures 
1 Industry Dissatisfaction of the Burden and its Ineffectiveness 
There is a widespread view that regulation of RSE licensees is more onerous than 
necessary and less than effective. In 2006, the first of three surveys were forwarded to a 
sample of 500 fund trustees selected at random primarily from the publicly available list 
on the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’s (APRA) website (Survey One). The 
2006 date accorded with the final transition period for APRA’s newly introduced 
Registrable Superannuation Entity and the Australian Securities Investment 
Commission’s Australian Financial Services Licensing (AFSL) licensing regimes. 
The total population available for Survey One was approximately 1160 trustees and 
RSE licensees. With the substantial reduction in trustees post 2004–6 RSE Reforms, 
Surveys Two and Three were able to take in the full cohort of RSE Licensees provided 
on APRAs publicly-available lists (241 in June 2010; 190 in June 2013).50 
The three surveys recorded an average response rate of 28%51 with respondents 
representing public offer funds, extended public offer funds and non-public offer 
entities. The basis of all voluntary, ethics-approved surveys was anonymity. 
Accordingly, only limited information relating to the ‘profile’ of trustees/licensees was 
permitted such as the type of fund (Surveys One, Two) and type of fund and years of 
experience of the licensees (Survey Three).  
Additional limitations of the survey process were two-fold: the capacity for an 
individual respondent to complete all three surveys; and negativity bias risk arising 
through responses being received only from individuals unhappy with regulatory levels 
and/or its negative impact on costs and member benefits. The findings, however, 
correspond with those of Butt et al52 and AIST & BNP Paribas Securities Services53, 
suggesting that even if proportions are distorted, the views expressed were widespread.  
Survey One (2006) canvassed institutions’ experience over the AFSL regime’s two 
years’ implementation period (to March 2004) and following two-year window to both 
                                                                                                                                                              
49  See, eg, Jeremy Cooper, Super System Review Final Report—Part One: Overview and 
Recommendations (CSSSR), (30 June 2010), [3.2.2]; See also Office of the Life Insurance 
Commissioner, Annual Report (1980); Annette Sampson, ‘Hop on Board the Gravy Train 
That Never Stops’, The Age (online), 8 May 2010 <http://www.smh.com.au/business/hop-
on-board-the-gravy-trainthat-never-stops-20100507-ujkw.html>. 
50  APRA, Insight Issue One, 2012, 18; APRA, Insight Issue One, 2014.. 
51  Survey One: 114/500 (23%); Survey Two: 69/241 (29%); Survey Three: 48/151 (32%). 
52  Adam Butt et al, ‘The Superannuation System and its Regulation: Views from Fund 
Executives’ (Working Paper 030/2014, Centre for International Finance and Regulation, 
July 2014) 2. 
53  AIST & BNP Paribas Securities Services, What will the superannuation industry be like in 2025? 
(13 March 2015) Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees 
<http://www.aist.asn.au/media/14258/2015_03_13_media_aist_bnpparibas_research_pre
view.pdf>. 
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obtain a RSE license and to register their RSEs (to June 2006). ‘Best practice’ governance 
expectation, during this time, carried with it expectations that efficiency gains would 
result when subscale funds, unable to meet new licensing and registration requirements, 
merged or outsourced their functions. Key survey issues related to (a) gathering of data 
and (b) fund trustees’ comments around overall costs and benefits resulting from the 
RSE-licensing reforms. Survey Two (2009/2010) was designed to further amplify the 
cost/benefit data collection process, three years on from the Survey One.  
Survey Three (2013/14—initial and reminder surveys sent) further focused on 
gathering cost/benefit data around annual compliance and administrative costs. Its 
focus remained couched on fund members’ benefit levels within the regulatory 
framework. Additional feedback from trustees was also sought on cost/benefit views 
and experiences around trust fund preparation for the implementation of the MySuper, 
SuperStream and new APRA-regulated prudential standards, all of which were then in 
process. 
Overall survey findings revealed three trustee/licensee experiences:  
1. An overwhelming negative response throughout the review period to 
cost/benefit experiences. The associated administrative and compliance costs 
related to fund governance (excluding commissions). Approaching $200 million 
annually in 2006, respondents identified continual cost rises each year 
throughout the nine-year period to 2014. This was true across all fund types and 
sizes as well as in terms of assets and membership.54  For example, 62% of 
licensees surveyed in 2013/14 expected to experience costs of $100,000 or more 
in meeting the costs related to the implementation of the prudential standards. 
Survey responses further revealed (with a 100% agreement) that overall 
compliance costs were anticipated to continue to rise annually.  
2. The majority of respondents believed that the regulatory changes failed to 
enhance member benefits. Of trustees/licensees in the 2006 survey, 42% 
indicated that the regulatory reforms (related to the RSE-based, licensing regime) 
would deliver minimal benefits to fund members. This percentage had changed 
only marginally by the 2010 survey, when 38% of the trustees surveyed believed 
that little or no benefits had been achieved for fund members as a result of the 
introduction of licensing. Of the 2010 respondents, 90% indicated compliance 
costs would significantly offset any gains achieved from improved risk 
management strategies. This was also true in 2013/14, when 57% of trustees 
responsible for more than $60 billion in superannuation assets, believed APRA’s 
prudential standards would produce little or no benefit to fund members. 
3. Survey Three also sought licensees’ view of the government’s consultation 
processes for the development of new regulations. Although 90% of the 
responding licensees had more than eight years’ experience, they gave a score of 
2.05 out of a possible 5 for the level of involvement that APRA had sought.  
APRA own stakeholder surveys confirm these results: 48% disagreed with the 
statement that APRA’s prudential framework considers the cost to industry; a further 
                                                                                                                                                              
54  Sue Taylor, ‘The $200 Million/Year Price Tag for Superannuation Fund Governance: A 
Case Study of Fund Member Loss’, (Paper Presented at the AFAANZ Conference, Gold 
Coast, July 2007). 
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35% were neutral.55 ASIC’s most recent stakeholder 2013 survey56 did not ask a question 
related to ‘cost to industry’. It did, however, report that 60% of their regulated entities 
thought that ASIC was failing to reduce red tape associated with compliance.57  
Many interviewees, in Butt et al, expressed particular exasperation over the burden 
of regulatory change, including the degree to which the rules have been in a state of flux. 
Although the majority accepted the necessity of regulation, the main concern was over 
too much happening all at once, coupled with high uncertainty over the rules’.58 Both 
factors were seen as inhibiting the capacity to address member needs and run a business. 
Further support derives from the 2015 AIST & BNP Paribas Securities Services findings59 
wherein 40% of superannuation fund trustees, CEOs, CIOs & CFOs, and other senior 
managers polled, believed that constant regulatory changes were the biggest future risk 
factor they faced. This can be compared with the 2016 Global Risks Report produced by 
the World Economic Forum,60 where regulatory change, unsurprisingly, failed to even 
get a mention in their list of 28 serious concerns.  
2 Administration and Investment Costs 
It is widely believed that costs within the industry are excessive as a result of economic 
rents paid to service providers within the superannuation industry. A key implication 
of moving to a mainly Defined Contribution (DC) system in Australia has been a shift in 
the burden of risks (such as longevity, investment and expense risks) from the employer 
to the individual. 61 APRA’s Annual Superannuation Bulletin shows that over 80% of 
assets are in DC arrangements62 , where the members’ benefits depend on the net 
investment return on their assets. The charges borne by members are of particular 
concern given APRA’s ‘powerful message’ 63  that, on average, the superannuation 
industry: 
can expect to earn average returns, and only that. Individual fund managers and 
individual asset classes may outperform others, but these effects are transient. Costs, on 
the other hand, are persistent. Between a strategy of pursuing gross returns and a strategy 
of minimising the difference between gross and net returns, the latter appears more 
fruitful.64 
                                                                                                                                                              
55  APRA, Stakeholder Survey—2015 Regulated institutions and knowledgeable observers (2015) 
<http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Publications/Documents/ASR-2015-SS-RI-and-
KO.pdf>. 
56  ASIC, Stakeholder Survey (11 September 2013) 
<http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1311529/ASIC-stakeholder-survey-2013-
1.pdf?_ga=1.17959345.906067860.1453164185>. 
57  Ibid 112. 
58  Butt et al, above n 52, 8. 
59  AIST & BNP Paribas Securities Services, above n 53, 1. 
60  World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2015, 11th Edition (2016) 
<https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2016>. 
61  Reserve Bank of Australia, Submission to the Financial System Inquiry (March 2014) 
<http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/04/Reserve_Bank_of_Australia.pdf > 29. 
62  APRA, Annual Superannuation Bulletin, above n 10, 19. 
63  APRA, Insight Issue One (2012) < http://www.apra.gov.au/Insight/Documents/12-Insight-
issue-1.pdf> 54. 
64 Ibid.  
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The extent of the charges is not easy to gauge. The larger financial services industry 
has a turnover of $146 billion annually 65 , or 9.5% of the GDP. 66  The APRA 
Superannuation Bulletin indicates the total expenses of all superannuation funds as 
$15.4 billion during 2016,67 but this does not include expenses paid by life insurers, unit 
trusts and stock brokers directly on their behalf, nor the revenue generated by merchant 
banks in servicing the capital markets that the funds dominate. The total is therefore 
certainly higher—perhaps by as much as a factor of three, implying that total charges 
average somewhere between 1% and 2.5% per annum of assets.68  
Within this average, it is very clear that costs differ significantly between funds, and 
the differences are largely felt by members with lower retirement benefits. It can be 
calculated that the 1.9% per annum that Industry funds outperform Retail funds could 
more or less double spending in retirement.69 The difference is too persistent and the 
numbers too large for this to be a statistical anomaly.70 A variety of research ascribes the 
difference to agency costs, which arise from the objectives of the largely bank-operated 
commercial retail funds against the trade-union dominated non-profit industry funds.71 
                                                                                                                                                              
65  Australian Bureau of Statistics, 5204.0 Australian System of National Accounts, Table 5. Gross 
Value Added (GVA) by Industry 
<http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/ABS@Archive.nsf/0/11C6681E4D26E070CA25
8059000EE9D4/$File/5204005_gva_by_industry.xls> Sheet ‘Data1’, cell AI67. 
66  Ibid Sheet ‘Data1’, cell DY67.  
67  APRA, Annual Superannuation Bulletin, above n 10, Table 4, 12. The figure is obtained by 
adding the investment and administration and operational costs. 
68  Anthony Asher, ‘Conflicted Super Structures: Are Australian Investors Being Short-
changed?’ in John Evans, Michael Orszag and John Piggott (eds), Pension Fund Governance 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008) 61–97, table 4.4, 86. 
69  See APRA, Annual Superannuation Bulletin, above n 10, 17 (Table 9) for the difference, which 
is the average over the past five years. The calculations are the authors’, and assume 45 
years of contribution to a superannuation fund, and 22 years of drawdown—with real 
investment returns of 3.1% and 5% respectively.  
70  Table 9 (APRA, Annual Superannuation Bulletin, above n 10, 17) reports a difference between 
the 25th and 75th quartiles as about 2% in 2016. If this is typical, and the distributions are 
normal, there is a more than 99% probability that the underlying difference between the 
funds exceeds 1.3% per annum. 
71  See Anthony D F Coleman, Neil Esho and Michelle Wong, ‘The impact of agency costs on 
the investment performance of Australian pension funds’ (2006) 5 Journal of Pension 
Economics and Finance 299; Adam Clements, Gemma Dale and Michael E Drew, ‘Australia’s 
retail superannuation fund industry: structure, conduct and performance’ (2006) 12 
Accounting, Accountability & Performance 1; Thi Thuy Chi Nguyen, Monica Tan and Marie-
Anne Cam, ‘Fund Governance, Fees and Performance in Australian Corporate 
Superannuation Funds: A Non-Parametric Analysis (2012) 11 Journal of Law and Financial 
Management 2; and Kevin Liu and Bruce R Arnold, Australian Superannuation Outsourcing: 
Fees, Related Parties and Concentrated Markets (12 July 2010) 
<http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Documents/SA_WP_ASOFRP_072010_complete.
pdf>. There is, however, limited evidence elsewhere. See Krzysztof Jackowicz and Oskar 
Kowalewski, ‘Crisis, Internal Governance Mechanisms and Pension Fund Performance: 
Evidence from Poland’ (2012) 13 Emerging Markets Review, 493; and Manuel Ammann and 
Christian Ehmann, ‘Is Governance Related to Investment Performance and Asset 
Allocation? Empirical Evidence from Swiss Pension Funds’ (Working Papers on Finance No 
2016/23, Swiss Institute of Banking and Finance, University of St. Gallen, September 2016) .  
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Asher explains most of the difference to commissions for advice and distribution costs72, 
although these too can at least partly be ascribed to agency issues, as discussed below. 
Overall, international statistics suggest that Australian fund members’ median 
expense ratios have consistently and significantly outstripped its OECD equivalents.73 
Although some reduction has been recorded, at its current pace Australia would not be 
expected to match the median expenses of OECD countries’ funded pension systems74 
within fifty (50) years. Moreover, since the implementation of RSE licensing (2004–6) and 
My Super (2010–11), Australia’s superannuation cost curve for fund members, initially 
at least, shifted upwards.75  
The April 2015 report from the Grattan Institute 76confirms the conclusions of their 
2014 report that in both default and choice funds, fees are higher than they need to be. 
In addition, there is little evidence that funds that charge higher fees provide better 
member services. In summary, the 2015 Grattan Report suggests that ‘superannuation 
could be run for much less than the $16 billion currently charged by large funds (self-
managed super costs another $5 billion).’  
When considering the reasons for these higher direct costs, Australian funds have 
been found, in detailed international fund level comparisons77, to be more expensive in 
two areas: those involving a larger number of manual transactions, and, more generally, 
around investment management costs. Manual costs have been addressed by the recent 
SuperStream regulatory changes. Investment costs are proving less tractable however, 
with a detailed study based on the CEM international database78 nominating in-house 
management as the way in which investment costs could be reduced and returns 
enhanced. A number of Australian industry funds have begun implementing this 
option.79 
These costs are at least reported, but others that are not reported to APRA nor 
(apparently) to the trustees in some cases. These include: 
                                                                                                                                                              
72  Asher, Conflicted Super Structures, above n 68, 86. 
73  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (‘OECD’), Pension Markets in 
Focus (2015) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/private-pensions/Pension-Markets-in-Focus-
2015.pdf> 9.  
74  Grattan Institute, Super Sting—How to Stop Australians Paying Too Much for Superannuation, 
(April 2014) < https://grattan.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/811-super-sting.pdf 
> 8. 
75  Ibid 7.  
76  Grattan Institute, Super Savings (April 2015) < https://grattan.edu.au/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/821-super-savings2.pdf > 2. 
77  Deloitte, ‘International superannuation & pension fund fees’, 2009, Prepared for IFSA, 44 
and 60.  




79  David R Gallagher, Tim Gapes and Geoff Warren, ‘In-House Investment Management: 
Making and Implementing the Decision’(Working Paper No 094/2016, Centre for 
International Finance and Regulation, March 2016).  
 
2017 Accountability in Regulatory Reform: Australia’s Superannuation Industry Paradox 15 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Investment management costs incurred by underlying managed funds or 
insurance policies that provide a net return to the superannuation funds;80 
 Additional interest margins lost because administrators and custodians do not 
obtain best value for money for deposits, foreign currency or derivative 
instruments;81  
 Stockbroker commissions or margins that are added to or subtracted from the 
price of shares and bonds and often not reported as expenses;82 
 Indirect costs of capital raising and restructuring, where again the costs are 
incorporated in share or bond prices.83 
The long delay in identifying these costs provides evidence in itself of the power of 
vested interests in hiding them from members and the public if not also from trustees. It 
is to be hoped that ASIC’s RG 97 will achieve more than a little success in this area. 
Lower cost ratios in other countries does not necessarily indicate that their pension 
systems provide an adequate benchmark in being free of overcharging and over-
servicing. Adair Turner84, then head of the UK Financial Services Authority, says: 
there are good reasons for believing that the financial industry, more than any other sector 
of the economy, has an ability to generate unnecessary demand for its own services — that 
more trading and more financial innovation can under some circumstances create harmful 
volatility against which customers have to hedge, creating more demand for trading 
liquidity and innovative products; that parts of the financial services industry have a 
unique ability to attract to themselves unnecessarily high returns and create instability 
which harms the rest of society.85 
In the same speech, he went on to quote: 
Chairman of the British Bankers’ Association, Stephen Green, who has said exactly the 
same thing in very similar words, when he argued that ‘in recent years, banks have chased 
                                                                                                                                                              
80  See Asher, Conflicted Super Structures, above n 68, 84 ff.  
81  For the banks’ response to these allegations, see Banks in denial about cash scam (March 3 
2017) Michael West <http://www.michaelwest.com.au/banks-in-denial-about-cash-
scam/>. 
82  It does not seem possible to estimate the extent of these costs, but the order or magnitude is 
given by the $908m turnover of the Australian Securities Stock Exchange. See Australian 
Securities Exchange, ASX Limited Annual Report 2016 (2016)< 
http://www.asx.com.au/documents/investor-relations/2016AnnualReport.pdf> 38. The 
same source gives the annual turnover of shares alone at over $1 trillion (28). One might 
speculate that stockbroker charges are at least that of the ASX revenue and that the 
superannuation funds bear half.  
83  Academics are puzzled as to why US merchant banks can charge 7% for raising capital and 
hedge funds can charge 2% of assets plus 20% of outperformance. See Mark Abrahamson, 
Tim Jenkinson and Howard Jones, ‘Why Don’t U.S. Issuers Demand European Fees for 
IPOs?’ (2011) 66 The Journal of Finance, 2055; and GauravAmin and Harry M. Kat,  ‘Hedge 
Fund Performance 1990–2000: Do the “Money Machines" Really Add Value?’ (2003) 38 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 251. 
84  Adair Turner, ‘Speech by Chairman, FSA’  (Speech delivered at the City Banquet, The 
Mansion House, London’, September 22 2009, < 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2009/0922_at.shtml >. 
85  Ibid. 
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short-term profits by introducing complex products of no real use to humanity’, and when 
he recognised that ‘some parts of our industry have become overblown.86 
Econometric modelling by the OECD confirms that salaries are higher for those 
working in finance than in comparable industries, and that growth of the financial sector 
not only has a negative impact on economic equality, but also on per capita economic 
growth.87 Given the extraordinary profitability of the FSS,88 the arguments apply a 
fortiori in Australia.  
The reported costs and performance of the SMSF sector can be seen as supporting 
this hypothesis. Their members are more capable than average of looking after their own 
interests.89 In his examination of the charges they incur, Raftery finds that they are on 
average half of that reported by APRA regulated funds, 90  suggesting that more 
informed people have fled the institutional funds, and reduced costs in spite of having 
lost economies of scale. Raftery does not calculate net investment returns but they can 
be estimated from APRA statistics.91 These suggest that total performance has not been 
significantly better than the institutional funds, which would be consistent with view 
that even informed individuals cannot beat the larger funds in reducing hidden and 
institutionalized costs in investment markets. 
Finally, although the direct costs of regulation appear to play a relatively small part 
in total fees charged, indirect costs are arguably more significant. Ongoing regulatory 
changes involving licensing and governance, twinned with increasing complexity, have 
provided little obvious benefit, while potentially distracting trustees from the more 
important goal of providing value at lower costs. The twenty year lead up to the 
SuperStream reforms and their obvious benefits provides evidence that even the 
regulators have been distracted.  
3 Conflicted Payments 
A more public and controversial criticism particularly aimed at the retail funds relates 
to the direct and indirect costs of distribution and advice, which is closely linked to 
whether advisors are conflicted between their duty to the clients and the commissions 
that they are paid by financial service providers. Within the superannuation field, as 
more broadly within common law business practices, there is a fiduciary duty: an 
‘“inflexible rule” which prohibits fiduciaries, such as corporate officers and advisers, 
                                                                                                                                                              
86  Ibid. 
87  Oliver Denk and Boris Cournede, ‘Finance and Income Inequality in OECD Countries’ 
(Working Paper No 1224, OECD Economics Department, 25 August 2015) 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2649944>; Oliver Denk, ‘Financial sector pay and labour 
income inequality.’ (Working Paper No 1225, OECD Economics Department)  OECD 
Publishing, Paris, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js04v5wjw9p-en>. 
88  See Janda, above n 12.  
89  Joanne K Earl, Paul Gerrans and Anthony Asher, When Cognitive Functioning Meets Financial 
Literacy and Judgment in Older Age: Advising Those Self-Managing Retirement Savings (2015) 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2562239>. 
90  Adrian M Raftery, The size, cost, asset allocation and audit attributes of Australian self-managed 
superannuation funds. (PhD thesis, University of Technology, Sydney, 2014), 137. 
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from putting themselves in positions where their interest and duty conflict.’92 This 
protection would be available to members of superannuation funds in the absence of 
any further legislation or regulation.  
The industry is however riddled with conflicts, some expressly permitted by 
regulation while others are overlooked in enforcement. Asher 93 lists various conflicted 
payments that can arise, including:  
adviser owes principal duty to member, but paid by fund, trustee or life company—
sometimes also with soft dollars; adviser rebates commission, so reducing superannuation 
account; adviser, trustee or group rebates or provides other benefits to employer; service 
providers make secret, discretionary or soft dollar payments to consultants; trustee or 
group makes, possibly, secret profit from holdings in adviser groups, service providers 
and consultants, or exercises discretions to make a greater disclosed profit at the expense 
of the members; and financial advisers receive, possibly, secret profits from service 
providers.  
The original FoFA reforms introduced in 2012 were aimed at some of these payments, 
and were the Labor Government’s response to a number of significant corporate 
collapses, which led to considerable losses for retail investors. Their solution was to 
create a ban on certain ‘conflicted remuneration’.94 The ban was politically controversial 
as it would largely have affected the commercial retail funds rather than Labor aligned 
industry funds. 
The original FOFA reforms were welcomed by both consumers and industry as a 
significant step forward in the financial services sector. CPA Australia and the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants Australia encapsulated the positive reception that the reforms 
received: 
The passage of the FoFA reforms was the result of extensive, wide spread 
consultation over many years. Its introduction marked a milestone opportunity for 
the sector to take a greater responsibility and refocus its efforts on providing and 
promoting quality financial advice in the best interests of the client, free from conflict 
and in a transparent manner.  
FOFA sought to strike a balance by 'introducing further consumer protections while 
simultaneously requiring financial advisers to meet higher standards of care and skill.95  
Industry Super Australia (ISA) summarises a report by Rice Warner Actuaries 
(RWA), in suggesting that the FoFA reforms would have ‘an unambiguously positive 
                                                                                                                                                              
92  J Glover, ‘Conflicts of interest in a corporate context’ in G Acquaah-Gaisie (ed), Corporate 
Crime Workshop (Monash University, Department of Business Law an Taxation, 2002), 39–
57, 46 quoting from Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44, 51. 
93 Asher, above n 68, 75. 
94  Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice 
Measures) Bill 2011 (Cth), 3. 
95  Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Corporations Amendment 
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impact on the affordability and provision of financial advice and a very positive impact 
on the future level of superannuation and other savings’.96 
In contrast, when the returning Coalition Government proposed amendments to the 
original FoFA laws to remove the outright ban, an updated report by RWA for ISA97 
revealed that it would have cost consumers more than $530 million annually in increased 
fees and charges. Although defeated by the Senate, the original public interest-based 
financial advice reforms introduced—termed the ‘biggest single change our industry 
will undergo in our generation’ by the Commonwealth Bank98—came precariously close 
to being eliminated. 
The agendas of all key lobby groups within the superannuation industry are clearly 
evident in their submissions to the Senate Economics Legislation Committee of the 
Corporations Amendment (Streamlining of Future of Financial Advice) Bill. That is, support 
for the Coalition Government’s amendments to the original FOFA reforms was received 
from the Financial Services Council who highlighted, in their submission that: 
given the significant value advice delivers, the FSC strongly supports the objective of 
promoting greater access to quality financial advice that is more accessible and more 
affordable for more Australians … The FSC has previously submitted that given the 
complexity and scale of the reforms and the relatively short timeframe to consult on 
amendments made in the lead up to the 2013 elections that unintended consequences and 
oversights would arise. Indeed, many unintended consequences and practical complexities 
(that of operationalising policy) are now evident. It is for this reason that we welcome the 
proposed amendments as they eliminate and address many of the regulatory ambiguity 
[sic]) 99 
The Australian Bankers’ Association’ submission also supported the Coalition 
Government’s amendments commenting, on behalf of the banking industry, that it was:  
seeking amendments to make sure the law operates as intended and does not adversely 
impact on retail banking and to make sure bank customers can continue to conduct their 
banking in ways they want and expect.100 
                                                                                                                                                              
96  Industry Super Australia, ‘ISA submission to the Exposure Draft of Corporations 
Amendment (Streamlining of Future of Financial Advice) Bill 2014’ 
<https://futureofadvice.treasury.gov.au/content/consultation/fofa_amendments/submis
sions/Industry_Super_Australia.pdf>, 11 referring to Rice Warner Actuaries, ‘The financial 
advice industry post FoFA’ (, prepared for Industry Super Australia, July 2013), < 
http://www.industrysuperaustralia.com/assets/Reports/Rpt-The-financial-advice-
industry-post-FoFA-2013.pdf. 
97  Rice Warner Actuaries, Consumer costs of FoFA amendments (May 2014) 
<http://www.industrysuperaustralia.com/assets/Reports/Rpt-Consumer-costs-of-FoFA-
amendments-ISA-21052014.pdf>. 
98  Commsec Adviser Services, 
<http://www.investing.commsecadviserservices.com.au/fofamadeeasy/fofa-overview/ >. 
99  Financial Services Council Submission No 27 to Senate Standing Committees on Economics, 
Inquiry into the Corporations Amendment (Streamlining of Future of Financial Advice) Bill 2014 
[Provisions], 5 May 2014, 5-6.  
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By contrast, the submission of Industry Super Australia, representing 15 industry 
funds, focused on what they believed to be the inaccurate rhetoric surrounding the 
introduction of the amendments, which talked about the need to ensure that people can 
access assistance and advice, particularly from bank tellers. In the view of Industry 
Super Australia, however, the exemption was not really about improved access, rather:  
There is already a complete exemption for basic banking products in the FoFA legislation. 
Therefore, what we are talking about is allowing commissions and other forms of 
conflicted remuneration to be paid on complex products, including superannuation but 
also others like managed investment schemes and leveraged products, which have been 
the subject of many previous inquiries due to the consumer losses that have ensued.101 
Additional to the lobbying attempts to capture the regulatory policy processes, 
serious enforcement issues have arisen which have contributed to problems faced by 
investors. A recommendation of the 2009 Parliamentary Joint Committee report102 that 
had led to the reforms was that ASIC undertake an annual shadow-shopping exercise to 
check on the quality of advice. To date, only two such surveys have been undertaken. 
The first on retirement advice in 2012103 found that 39% of advice was poor and only 3% 
were ‘examples of good quality advice’. The second on life insurance advice in 2014104 
found that 37% of the advice examined ‘failed to comply with the laws relating to 
appropriate advice.’ The indication is that ASIC is well behind in enforcing existing laws. 
It’s most recent report on enforcement action105 lists only two enforceable undertakings 
with institutions in recent years, and actions against only 6 advisors. It is clear that many 
members have been placed in inappropriate products and overcharged. 
The inadequacy of its 2010–13 enforceable undertaking against the Commonwealth 
Bank has been exposed by a Parliamentary Inquiry, which in 2015: 
uncovered an aggressive sales culture amongst Commonwealth Bank financial planning 
businesses which led to forgery, advisers hiding information from their clients and people 
losing life savings … advice should not be clouded by any type of financial incentive that 
reward advisers based on how much of a particular product they sell.106 
                                                                                                                                                              
101  Commonwealth, Public Hearings on the Corporations Amendment (Streamlining of Future of 
Financial Advice) Bill 2014, Senate Economics Legislation Committee, 22 May 2014, Ms 
Robbie Campo, Deputy Chief Executive, Industry Super Australia, 56. 
102  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Inquiry into 
Financial Products and Services in Australia, 2009. 
103  ASIC, ‘12-55MR ASIC releases full report on retirement advice shadow shopping research’ 
(Media Release, 27 March 2012) <http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/find-a-
media-release/2012-releases/12-55mr-asic-releases-full-report-on-retirement-advice-
shadow-shopping-research/>. 
104  ASIC, REP413 Review of retail life insurance advice (2014) 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-413-
review-of-retail-life-insurance-advice/>. 
105  ASIC, REP 444 ASIC enforcement outcomes: January to June 2015 (2015) 
<http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-444-asic-
enforcement-outcomes-january-to-june-2015>. 
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Arguably, the entire FSRA and its regulations are poor legislation; excessively 
complex and prescriptive, as often prohibiting useful innovation107 as well as being 
unenforceable. It may well provide more of an obstacle to the improvement of financial 
advice than a deterrent to those who are breaking the common law (as the elements 
requiring quality advice are more problematic to enforce.) 
In summary, the overall findings of this analysis support contentions that the 
Government’s effectiveness around its superannuation policy agendas has been 
progressively eclipsed by the lobbying power of vested interests. The public-interest 
policy objectives of bipartisan legislative reforms have not materialised, therein creating 
this reform paradox. Given the complex nature of the superannuation product and its 
value to both the retail and not-for-profit sectors of the superannuation industry, 
ongoing patterns of vested interest-friendly regulatory reforms are certainly likely. 
Conversely, the ability of the far more diffused and less informed fund members to 
minimize this outcome appears limited in the absence of specifically designed strategies 
to mitigate the distortions to the regulatory processes generated by lobbyists.  
B Public vs Private Interests: Regulatory Captures 
Public and private interest models of regulatory theory shed insight into the origins of 
the regulatory reform paradox. Public interest theory is built on the fundamental 
assumptions that economic markets are subject to market failures and, as a result, can 
operate inefficiently. Government reform to correct these market failures is therefore 
necessary. Thus, the public interest paradigm is based on the assumption that the 
government will act on behalf of the public to improve welfare in situations where the 
market has failed to do so.108 The public interest model provides one relevant analytical 
framework for assessing remedial measure to this problem.  
In contrast to this public interest theory, the 1980’s ‘Stiglerian’109 version of private 
interest theory was developed by economists, building off Adam Smith and Mancur 
Olson. 110  Findings in this respect have highlighted outcomes wherein government 
regulations appeared, in many cases, to have primarily served the interests of small, 
powerful interest groups rather than the public interest. Within this framework, 
government regulation is seen as a market for wealth transfers, with politicians having 
the power to coerce to affect wealth transfers, which product is then ‘sold’. To become 
the ‘highest bidders’ in this lobbying process, private-interest theorists argue that voters 
                                                                                                                                                              
107  One example is that superannuation funds have not been sure whether they were entitled 
to provide obviously useful benefit illustrations to members. See Actuaries Institute 




108  Refer to the seminal publications: Barry M Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation ( 
Columbia University Press, 1980); Douglas Needham, The Economics and Politics of 
Regulation: A Behavioural Approach, ( Little, Brown and Company, 1983); Richard A Posner, 
‘Theories of Economic Regulation’(1974) 4 The Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science 335. 
109  George J Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’(1971) 2 Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 3. 
110  Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press, 1965). 
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form special interest groups, which are able to exert a powerful influence on the political 
process. The sale price takes the form of explicit payments to Governments (eg bribes, 
campaign contributions, etc) or subtler forms of payment (eg assurances of factional 
voting support).111  
Producers within this original formulation of the private interest model will 
generally seek to maximise their wealth by lobbying for regulation involving less 
competitive market dynamics (e.g. price fixing, restriction of entry, subsidies, and 
suppression of substitutes). As producer groups are generally small relative to consumer 
groups, and where profits are potentially large, producer groups are easier to organise 
and strongly incentivised to seek self-benefitting regulation. Consumers, conversely, 
face an insignificant incentive per person to oppose regulation. The ‘protective’ 
regulatory shield sought by incumbent producers is to ensure that these benefits are 
‘delivered’ by government in an opaque manner, such as in the form of highly technical 
and complex supervisory regulations, which allow little scope for fund 
member/consumer recognition of the ‘hidden’ benefits/subsidies to producers and, 
therefore, see no reason to mount any form of counter lobbying campaign.112 This 
private interest model thus sets out an alternative analytical framework for considering 
remedial solutions to the reform paradox.  
Regulatory capture theory provides another perspective that aligns with the 
regulatory outcomes described. Harvard’s Tobin Project113 has generated a range of 
studies around industry-based capture deriving from barriers to entry, and which can 
be argued to characterise current superannuation regulation. Tobin research reconsiders 
Stiglerian concepts of regulatory capture which predominantly focused on rent seeking 
activities designed to generate more regulation: for example, creating barriers to entry to 
new firms.  
Corrosive capture is distinguishable in this context from the original concepts of 
statutory and agency capture given that its primary focus is to: 114  
dismantle regulation even in the absence of public support or a strong welfare rationale 
for doing so. [With] … corrosive capture occurring if organized firms render regulation 
less robust than intended in legislation or than what the public interest would recommend. 
By less robust we mean that the regulation is, in its formulation, application, or 
enforcement, rendered less stringent or less costly for regulated firms (again, relative to a 
world in which the public interest would be served by the regulation in question). 
Corrosive capture mechanisms can be applied by private interest groups in either a 
legislative or administrative context. They would occur without express sanction by 
voters through ‘increased independence of the regulator vis-a-vis the legislature, and 
possibly reduced fidelity to its statutory obligations.’115 From the perspective of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
111  See, more broadly, Eric A Posner, ‘Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A 
Positive Political Theory Perspective’ (2001) University of Chicago Law Review 1137; Sam 
Peltzman, ‘Towards a More General Theory of Regulation’ (1976) 19 Journal of Law and 
Economics, 211–240; Gary S Becker, ‘A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for 
Political Influence’ (1983) 98 Quarterly Journal of Economics 371. 
112  Sue Taylor, ‘Captured Legislators and Their Twenty Billion Dollar Annual Superannuation 
Cost Legacy’ (2011) 58 (3) Australian Accounting Review 268. 
113  Daniel Carpenter and David A Moss, Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special interest influence 
and how to limit it (The Tobin Project, Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
114  Ibid 16–17. 
115  Ibid 17. 
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Tobin Project scholars, most of the public and academic discussion about capture in 
recent decades is about regulatory corrosion given their de-regulatory focus.  
Theorists of regulatory capture have also identified that capture is more likely when 
regulation is highly complex, and when information asymmetries between the regulated 
industry and the regulators are greater. That is:  
the complexity inherent in financial regulatory policies and the built-in advantage that the 
financial firms targeted by specific regulation have in terms of knowledge and information 
vis-à-vis other stakeholders are factors that increase the dependence on industry for 
expertise. Moreover, many analysts have lamented the lack of engagement with financial 
regulatory debates from stakeholders such as deposit holders, investors, and consumers of 
financial services. Besides being disadvantaged vis-à-vis financial industry groups in terms 
of financial resources and technical expertise, these groups’ voices remain hindered by 
their diffuse nature and the resulting ‘collective action problems’.116 
The authors believe that the complexity of the SIS Act and the FSRA particularly 
plays an important role in the regulatory paradox within Australia’s superannuation 
industry as it generally benefits vested interests and acts as a screen for rent seekers. The 
problem is wider than that identified in the superannuation industry with Justice Steven 
Rares opining that:117 
the policy choice of using prescriptive drafting that most Commonwealth legislation has 
reflected over the last two or three decades needs urgent reconsideration. It has really 
significant impacts on the whole community in terms of comprehensibility, compliance 
costs and, to use a political catch cry, access to justice. 
A recent UK surveys of trustees118 highlights that there are international analogues. 
The Parliamentary Counsel Cabinet Office119recently called for an in-depth analysis of 
resulting complexity created in this context. In the view of the Parliamentary Counsel: 
we should regard the current degree of difficulty with law as neither inevitable nor 
acceptable. We should be concerned about it for several reasons. Excessive complexity 
hinders economic activity, creating burdens for individuals, businesses and communities. 
It obstructs good government. It undermines the rule of law. 
A further element of regulatory capture can be described as intellectual capture, 
wherein regulators, attempting to control too much in much detail, increasingly adopt 
the perspective of the regulated industry producers who are the only source of the 
relevant technicalities.120 At the heart of this form of capture is the broader intellectual 
climate which is characterised by the: 
                                                                                                                                                              
116  Stefano Pagliari, Making good financial regulation: Towards a policy response to regulatory 
capture (Grosvenor House Publishing, 2012) 10-11, citing Olson, above n 111.  
117  Steven Rares J, ‘Competition, Fairness and the Courts’ (2014) 28(3) Commercial Law 
Quarterly: The Journal of the Commercial Law Association of Australia 17.  
118  Kristian Brunt-Seymour, Trustees warn DC governance changes have not benefited members (19 
January 2016) Professional Pensions <http://www.professionalpensions.com/professional-
pensions/news/2442379/trustees-warn-dc-governance-changes-have-not-benefitted-
members#>. 
119  UK Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, When laws become too complex (16 April 2013) 
Cabinet Office  <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/when-laws-become-too-
complex/when-laws-become-too-complex>.  
120  UK academic John Kay suggests that regulatory capture needs to be explained by more 
than self-interest: ‘That is … regulators come to see the industry through the eyes of market 
 
2017 Accountability in Regulatory Reform: Australia’s Superannuation Industry Paradox 23 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
ascendancy within the academic community and many regulatory authorities of ideas 
highlighting the efficiency of financial markets at understanding and allocating risks, their 
self-stabilizing nature, and the benefits of financial innovations for the economy.121  
Of importance to note, while the traditional concept of regulatory capture in the 
academic literature has focused on material incentives between regulators and different 
stakeholders: 
the recent financial crisis has led a number of authors to broaden this concept and to 
investigate how the possibility that regulatory policies will favour a narrow set of special 
interests could be influenced by the regulators’ ideas, beliefs and mind-sets. Terms such as 
‘intellectual capture’, ‘cognitive capture’, and ‘cultural capture’ have been used to signal 
instances where … special interests are able to ‘shape policy outcomes through influences 
other than material incentives and rational debate’. For instance, … in the period before 
the crisis the Federal Reserve displayed ‘excess sensitivity … not just to asset prices but 
also to the concerns and fears of Wall Street more generally’.122 
It would seem that this ideology forestalled the introduction of more directive 
reforms such as SuperStream that enforced collaboration, and MySuper, which has 
explicitly restricted over-servicing and over-charging. At least the former is regarded as 
having reduced costs significantly, while the latter explicitly recognises over-servicing 
as a problem. 
IV REFINING AUSTRALIAN REGULATORY IMPACT STATEMENTS 
(RIS) 123 
This Part first outlines a potential administrative remedy designed to blunt the rent 
seeking activities of the financial services sector. It rests on the concept of Cost Benefit 
Analysis (CBA), which is a key plank in Australia’s existing Regulatory Impact Analysis 
(RIA) structure and which has now been the subject of bi-partisan support for some 
decades. We then go on to show that the policy has been weakly enforced when applied 
to superannuation reform particularly. 
A Cost-Benefit Analysis 
As highlighted by Rose and Walker,124 CBA ranks among the most important decision-
making tools in the modern regulatory state. In the United States its congressional 
mandate dates from 1902 when all federal agencies were compelled to present 
                                                                                                                                                              
participants rather than the end users they exist to serve, because market participants are 
the only source of the detailed information and expertise this type of regulation requires. 
This complexity has created a financial regulation industry—an army of compliance 
officers, regulators, consultants and advisers—with a vested interest in the regulation 
industry’s expansion.’ John Kay, ‘Finance needs stewards, not toll collectors’, Financial 
Times (London) 22 July 2012, <http://www.johnkay.com/2012/07/22/finance-needs-
stewards-not-toll-collectors>. 
121  Pagliari, 2012, above n 116, 15–16. 
122  Ibid 16. 
123  For a detailed discussion of RIS, see Sue Taylor, Anthony Asher and Julie-Anne Tarr, 
‘Australia’s Flawed Regulatory Impact Statement Process’ (2016) 44 Australian Business Law 
Review 361. 
124  Paul Rose and Christopher J Walker, The Importance of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial 
Regulation, Report for U.S. Chamber of Commerce  (March 2013). 
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cost/benefit analysis around proposed action.125 Over the past 30 years in particular, 
CBA has become a fundamental part of how US federal agencies analyse and select 
regulatory approaches.126  
At the global level, the OECD contends that a coherent, whole-of-government 
approach is needed to create a regulatory environment favourable to the creation and 
growth of businesses, productivity gains, competition, investment and international 
trade.127 This is enshrined in the OECD’s Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and 
Performance (Guiding Principles), including the requirement of systemic assessment 
and review of regulations to ensure that they efficiently and effectively meet their 
intended objectives. The OECD’s 2015 Government at a Glance Report128 suggests that 
a fully implemented, quantitative based regulation impact analysis (RIA) has the 
capacity to minimise rent seeking by fostering transparency and engagement and, by 
reinforcing the checks/balances systems to ensure policies and regulations, serve the 
public interest. The Australian Government has endorsed these for its own regulatory 
governance arrangements.129 
Rose and Walker group pro-CBA policy considerations130 into two main classes: 
first,  
cost-benefit analysis promotes more rational decision-making and more efficient 
regulatory actions. Second, when combined with notice-and-comment requirements, cost-
benefit analysis promotes good public governance as a transparent, democratic, and 
accountable regulatory methodology.131 
Its application to Australia also has the support of the Business Council of Australia 
(BCA), which presents a strong case for evidence-based policy making employing a CBA 
framework, as endorsed by the Australian Productivity Commission and the Australian 
Law Council. The BCA emphasises that: 132 
In order for government decision-makers to ensure that government policy is generating 
the maximum benefit for society, decisions need to be based on robust evidence. Further, 
that evidence needs to be communicated transparently and in a timely manner to business 
and the community. Evidence is crucial to good government policy outcomes because it: 
helps policymakers work out which policy options are likely to achieve the best results; 
and helps in getting policy implemented in circumstances where there is opposition to it. 
The science of quantification behind CBA admittedly needs further development, 
with Posner and Weyl133, for instance, suggesting ways of quantifying the costs of crises, 
                                                                                                                                                              
125  Act of 13 June 1902, ch 1079, 32 Stat 331, 372. 
126  See Cass R Sunstein, ‘The Cost-Benefit State: The Future of Regulatory Protection’ (Working 
Paper No 39,, Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics, 1996) 33. 
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128  OECD, Government at a Glance 2015 (2015). 
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131  Ibid. 
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and the market benefits of new products and services. Even in its current state, however 
it is, a well-respected tool for keeping regulators focused on critical quantifiable 
costs/benefits and risk minimisation. Its use also protects and enhances agency 
rulemaking by providing a  
defensible regulatory process that not only is more efficient, but also is more likely to 
reduce the need for extensive revisions following public comments and will protect the 
agency against challenges to its regulations.134 
As set out in the updated Australian Government Guide to Regulation (AGGR),135 
the Government has enunciated a new, clear approach to regulation which focuses on 
reducing the regulatory burden by cutting existing red tape and limiting the flow of new 
regulation. The AGGR serves to re-focus attention on Australia’s existing RIS process 
with the requirement that every policy proposal designed to introduce or abolish 
regulation must be accompanied by a RIS. This RIS must be developed early in the policy 
making process as a tool designed to encourage rigour, innovation and better policy 
outcomes from the beginning. In turn, the Office of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR) has 
been delegated the role of promoting the Federal Government’s objective of effective 
and efficient legislation and regulations.  
The RIS process is mandatory for all Cabinet submissions and applies to every 
government agency including government departments, statutory authorities, boards 
(even if it has statutory independence), and public entities operating under the Public 
Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth). The 2014 AGGR also highlights 
that even decision not requiring at the Cabinet level, a RIS is still required where the 
policy proposal is likely to have a measurable impact on business, community 
organisations or individuals. 136 This includes new regulations, amendments to existing 
regulations and, in some cases, ‘sunsetted’ regulations being remade.  
To be assessed as adequate by the OBPR, a RIS must have a degree of detail and 
depth of analysis that is commensurate with the magnitude of the problem and the size 
of the potential impact of the proposal. Subject to this principle, the criteria which will 
be used by the OBPR to assess whether a RIS contains an adequate level of information 
and analysis include the requirements that the RIS should identify a range of alternative 
options including, as appropriate, non-regulatory, self-regulatory and co-regulatory 
options.  
The only exceptions to these rules, which are set out in the 2014 AGGR,137 are 
designated ‘special cases’ which include: 
1 Prime Minister’s Exemptions 
The Prime Minister can exempt a government entity from the need to complete a RIS 
when: there are truly urgent and unforeseen events requiring a decision before an 
adequate regulatory impact assessment can be undertaken; and where there is a matter 
of Budget or other sensitivity and the development of a RIS could compromise 
confidentiality and cause unintended market effects, or lead to speculative behaviour 
which would not be in the national interest. Where the Prime Minister grants an 
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135  Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (2014) 4. 
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exemption, the agency will not be deemed as non-compliant with the RIS 
requirements.138  
2 Election Commitments 
A RIS covering matters which were the subject of an election commitment will not be 
required to consider a range of policy options. Only the specific election commitment 
need be the subject of regulatory impact assessment and in this situation, the focus 
should be on the commitment and the manner in which the commitment should be 
implemented.  
3 Carve-outs 
A carve-out is a standing agreement between the OBPR and a department, removing the 
need for a preliminary assessment to be sent to the OBPR for minor or recurrent certain 
types of regulatory reforms. Examples of acceptable carve outs include: routine 
indexation that uses a well-established formula, such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI); 
routine indexation of aged care subsidies in line with increases in the CPI; and regularly 
updating of the listing and price of medicines available under the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Scheme. 
An additional central pillar of ensuring transparency in regulatory practice by the 
Federal Government and its agencies is the post-implementation review (PIR). As set 
out in the OBPR’s Post-Implementation Reviews Guidance Note, 139  all Australian 
Government agencies are required to undertake a PIR for all regulatory changes that 
have major impacts on the economy. PIRs must also be prepared when regulation has 
been introduced, removed, or significantly changed without a regulation impact 
statement (RIS). This may be because an adequate RIS was not prepared for the final 
decision, or because the Prime Minister granted an exemption from the RIS 
requirements. 
B Weak Form Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) and Post-Implementation 
Review (PIR) Processes Undertaken 
The ability of RISs to act as a potential gatekeeper/remedy to blunt the forces of 
regulatory capture from a policy perspective is well tested domestically and 
internationally. This is not to suggest the RIS process is without limitations140, but RISs 
help create greater transparency around proposed regulatory frameworks without 
requiring legislators to acquire the same level of specialised knowledge as their 
                                                                                                                                                              
138  Where a Prime Minister’s exemption is granted, agencies are still required to quantify the 
cost of the regulation and identify offsets and provide those costings to OBPR within three 
months of the decision. Once costings are agreed they should be sent to the relevant 
portfolio Minister and the Prime Minister. The OBPR will also publish the costing 
information on the OBPR’s website together with the fact that a Prime Minister’s exemption 
was granted. 
139  OBPR, Post-Implementation Reviews Guidance Note (2014) 1 
<https://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/017_Post-
implementation_reviews_0.pdf>. 
140  See for example, Ric Simes, Ian Harper and Hugh Green, ‘Implementing Best Practice 
Regulation in a Dynamic Market Place: Consultation and Accountability’ (2008) 27 Economic 
Papers 24.. 
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agents.141 RIS efficacy is, of course, necessarily dependent upon its implementation. We 
give four examples in the Superannuation context where it does not seem to have been 
applied appropriately. 
1 The SIS Act 
There appears to have been no form of RIS for the foundational SIS Act. The SIS Act and 
Regulations, moreover, appear to have been passed without consideration of many of 
the member protection mechanisms recommended in the extensive report by the 
Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) and Companies and Securities Advisory 
Committee (CSAC) completed in the previous year. 142 It is recommended, inter alia, 
that: 
 trustees should not be indemnified out of the fund, but section 58 however 
explicitly permits this; 
 the dominant purpose should be the ‘provision of old age pensions’ as another 
purpose might be unconstitutional (p 58), but section 62 permits any payments 
so the dominant purpose has become the payment of lump sums; 
 trustees, investment managers and advisors should be fit and proper and the 
latter should be subject to  know your client rules. These are partly covered, but 
as discussed below, gaps remain;  
 prohibition of conflict of interest should be central, but section 58B specifically 
exempts the trustees from important elements of this common-law requirement.  
 A number of other recommendations, which would also have offered significant 
protection, were not implemented. These include: 
o members should also have the right to dismiss the responsible entity in 
certain circumstances; 
o members should be given an annual report disclosing the payment of 
all fees and charges, as well as significant asset holdings; 
o an advisory service be established to provide education and 
conciliation; 
o the regulator should have the power to enforce contracts and to sue 
investment managers.  
Although a national program of review and reform of existing legislation was 
commenced in 1996 with a target completion date of 31 December 2000, the SIS Act 
review (conducted by the Productivity Commission)143 did not eventuate until 2001. 
This eight-year delay was then further complicated by non-issuance until 2003 of formal 
Government responses to the Productivity Commission’s 2001 review comments. It 
identified that the legislation was ‘voluminous, complex and in some respects, overly 
prescriptive’,144  and created unnecessary restriction of competition and compliance 
                                                                                                                                                              
141  Posner, above n 111, 1. 
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costs. These problems have still not been addressed. Given the focus of the Commission 
on productivity rather than member protection, it did not consider any shortcomings in 
that area. 
2 Registerable Superannuation Entity Licensing 
The Explanatory Statement to the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Amendment 
Regulations (2004), No. 113 advised that a RIS was not required because the measures 
had already been addressed in the RIS for the enabling legislation or ‘are of a minor or 
machinery of government nature.’ 145The RIS for the Superannuation Safety Amendment 
Act 2004 (Cth), however only related to the mechanics of the reform and there was no 
quantitative analysis for either the costs or benefits associated with the regulatory 
reforms. 
Thus, the licensing regime was introduced without a specific, quantitative RIS. In 
addition, given the wording of the exemption for the Regulations, the carve-out 
provisions allowed the licensing regime to be exempted from any PIR. This perfunctory 
treatment stands in stark contrast to the statistical impacts of RSE licensing which 
contributed to a significant reduction in superannuation funds from 2001 to 2015 as 
discussed in Part III. 
3 Prudential Standards 
APRA prepared a RIS for its suite of eleven prudential standards, stating that: ‘the 
introduction of prudential standards for superannuation is aimed at improving the 
governance standards of a relative minority of RSE licensees.’146 Of concern in its RIS, 
however, was an absence of any quantitative analysis for either the costs or benefits 
associated with the implementation and operation of the standards. 
This absence of a clear cost/benefit impact existed in spite of APRA acknowledging 
that the implementation costs by RSE licensees of the prudential standards requirements 
would ultimately be borne by members of RSEs in the form of higher fees and/or lower 
investment returns. From APRA’s perspective:  
overall, it is not clear how large this cost will be because the Stronger Super reforms are 
creating an environment with more transparency and comparability of fees and costs, and 
this competition may lower fees … for this reason, the costs of implementing the prudential 
standards are not quantified in this RIS.147 
In terms of benefits for RSE licensees from the introduction of prudential standards, 
APRA claimed that:  
prudential standards provide greater clarity of how the requirements of the SIS Act and 
SIS Regulations can be met and requirements in prudential standards can be set in a way 
that is flexible and principles-based which provides freedom for RSE licensees to interpret 
the requirements in line with the size and complexity of their business operations.148 
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4 Labor’s FoFA Laws and Subsequent Coalition Amendments 
The FoFA reforms reveal yet another RIS shortfall. In this instance, although a RIS was 
provided, its limitations were marked. As previously highlighted, the Coalition 
amendments to the Labor Government’s original public-interest-based FoFA reforms 
were designed to repeal the ‘best interests’ duty, remove the opt-in requirement and 
relax the ban on commissions in a number of areas.  
In the FoFA Amendments, the Treasury authored March 2014 submission to OPBR 
(‘Details-stage Regulation Impact Statement’) reported that:149 
The key reforms … are estimated to produce average ongoing compliance cost savings of 
around $190 million per year,150 as well as once-off implementation cost savings of around 
$88 million … Overall, the measures were assessed as having a major impact on the 
broader economy and therefore given a B rating (on a scale of A to D) in relation to the 
level of analysis required. 
This Treasury prepared RIS, despite its significant pedigree as an election 
commitment to reduce regulatory burdens and costs in the FSS, failed to quantify any 
benefits/costs for consumers.151 Effectively incomplete, it was nevertheless assessed as 
adequate by the OBPR. 
The RWA 2013 Report152, however, identified consumer benefits as being more than 
twice that of the cost to industry over the next 15 years. In total, benefits of the original 
FoFA reforms were estimated to be $6.8 billion, far exceeding the cost of $2.4 billion over 
the next 15 years. This saving accords with another estimate of $6.6 billion in annual 
commissions paid by superannuation members and consumers of financial products per 
year prior to FoFA. 153  Modelling of the FoFA reforms also highlighted benefits in 
addition to the savings to super members and consumers of financial products. That is, 
RWA predicted that by 2027 the FoFA reforms would: boost Australians’ savings under 
advice by $144 billion; reduce the average cost of advice from $2,046 (before the reforms) 
to $1,163, and double the provision of financial advice from 893,000 pieces to 1.88 million 
pieces. 
By focusing only on the cost savings to the financial services industry at the cost of 
ignoring consumer benefits, the RIS attached to the Coalition Government’s FoFA 
Amendments paralleled a similar US based RIS misuse incident highlighted by Fisch.154 
It is also inconsistent with the guidelines in the Best Practice Regulation Handbook that: 
‘best practice regulation-making … must be effective in addressing an identified 
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problem and be efficient in maximising the benefits to the community, taking account 
of the costs’. 155 
C Summary—Independent Review Findings 
A lack of enthusiastic take-up of the RIS process therefore is relatively well 
documented.156 An Independent Review of the Australian Government’s Regulatory 
Impact Analysis Process (‘the Review’), was extremely critical of many aspects of the 
Government’s policy development processes, including the public service, ministers, 
and adherence to Cabinet processes.157 For example, the Review found that there was ‘a 
widespread lack of acceptance of, and commitment to the RIS process by Ministers and 
agencies’.158  
Major criticisms highlighted included 31 Prime Minister’s exemptions from the RIS 
process under the Rudd/Gillard Governments which meant, amongst others, that ‘the 
introduction of the Fair Work Act, the establishment of the National Broadband 
Network and the banning of the ‘super trawler’ from Australian waters, had not been 
subject to scrutiny’. 159 Moreover, the Review Panel highlighted that while it had lacked 
capacity to examine the reasons why particular Prime Ministerial exemptions had been 
sought or granted ‘the reason appears to have more to do with it being expedient to 
decisions that the Government wanted to make.160  
Prime Minister’s exemptions exercised across 2008–14 are ascertainable from 
statistics provided within the Annual Reports of the OBPR. They confirm 38 Prime 
Minister’s exemptions granted (based on exceptional circumstances) to the RIS process. 
During the same period, 48 non-compliant Regulatory Impact Statements and three 
regulatory changes with a substantial or widespread impact on the economy were 
recorded.161  
Of great concern around the RIS processes implemented for the RSE Reforms, the 
APRA-based Prudential Standards, the exemptions granted to some aspects of the 
Stronger Super Reforms, and in relation to both the original FoFA laws and the latter 
introduced Amendments, is the lack of detailed quantitative, economic-based analysis 
to force the disclosure of any extraction of rents from fund members that may occur 
within the regulatory structure being proposed.  
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In turn, the weak-form implementation of RIS both in the superannuation industry 
and throughout the broader Australian government regulatory processes generally, 
provides an example of the concept of ‘corrosive capture’ as previously outlined which 
is designed to ‘dismantle regulation even in the absence of public support or a strong 
welfare rationale for doing so’.162  
The reality is that a significant proportion of the regulatory reforms in the 
superannuation industry in Australia over the last two and half decades have not been 
required to undergo serious, cost/benefit scrutiny. The weak-form RIS implementation 
process applied has been unable, in its formulation, application, or enforcement, to 
genuinely serve the public interest.  
V CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Afterword to the Tobin Project’s Preventing Regulatory Capture observes: 
For the most part, a country’s regulatory framework serves the public interest well. It helps 
keep [people] safe from pollutants, personal injury, and other harms and supports the 
orderly operation of a dynamic economy. Yet the threat of regulatory capture is ever 
present. When powerful interests gain excessive influence over legislators and regulatory 
agencies, the integrity of the regulatory process is compromised, and catastrophic 
consequences can unfold. 163 
This article brings into stark relief, in terms of the Australian superannuation 
industry specifically and the Financial Services Sector generally, the reality that lobbying 
activities for or against Government policies are continually present. While it is unlikely 
that this capture risk can be removed from the regulatory reform process in the 
superannuation industry entirely, it seems possible to channel lobbying activity through 
mechanisms that mitigate their impact. The RIS process, fully implemented, has the 
potential to provide an effective remedy to the reform paradox, ensuring compatibility 
of public and private objectives. By forcing legislators to fully consider a detailed, 
transparent economics-based analysis of both costs and benefits of any proposed 
regulatory reforms, the RIS process creates the capacity to identify and reject illegitimate 
rent seeking.  
At present in Australia, patchy or non-existent implementation is thwarting the 
stated objectives/purposes of the RIS process. For example, as noted in the 2012 
Regulatory Impact Analysis Benchmarking Report by the Productivity Commission: 164 
Of greatest concern … is the perception that in some jurisdictions proposals (often 
politically contentious) with highly significant impacts are more likely not to be subjected 
to adequate RIA than other less significant proposals, either because: they are more likely 
to be granted an exemption from the process by the Prime Minister, Premier, Treasurer or 
relevant delegated officer. 
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It is of concern that the Productivity Commission’s findings repeat those of the 2006 
Banks Taskforce Report. 165 Some of these criticisms have been somewhat redressed in 
the release of the OBPR’s updated 2014 AGGR, but carve out provisions creating broad 
discretion around linguistic interpretation remain problematic.166 
In discussing the reality of the large gap that can exist between the principle and 
practice of RIS, the PC in their 2012 Report argued that: 167 
improving RIS quality is unlikely to be achieved by simply providing more detailed 
guidance material or further strengthening analytical requirements. Based on the evidence 
examined, such an approach would likely only further widen the gap between principle 
and practice. In view of this, other approaches are needed. 
Our research within the superannuation industry supports this contention. There has 
been a continued failure by Governments to fulfil their own, stated, public interest 
objectives, and to enforce a detailed, quantitative analysis in relation to regulatory 
reforms. The absence of such evidence-based analysis is also inconsistent with the 
OECD’s Guiding Principles, to which Australia is a signatory.  
To ensure that the RIS process can more effectively blunt the force of all forms of 
capture and therefore provide a remedy to the reform paradox facing Australian fund 
members, the following recommendations are suggested.  
First, that both political parties, as a social imperative, pursue regulatory capture as 
a systemic risk across all agencies and legislative processes. As suggested by Whitehouse 
and Leach, consideration should be given to establishing an official public advocate, 
with expertise in highly technical financial regulation, who is charged with representing 
the public interest during the regulatory process.168 
Second, integrated with the creation of an official, expert, public advocate, to allow 
for an informed debate among different stakeholders, steps need to be taken to address 
the informational advantage of all industry insiders participating in any RIS-related 
consultations. For example, both the APRA and the ASIX need to be empowered to 
generate and disseminate information to remedy the informational disadvantage vis-à-
vis the industry and any lobbyists. This release of data: ‘will help energize the public to 
overcome collective action problems and rally behind the agency … so that they can 
engage in the issues, possibly against the deep pockets of the incumbents’.169 
Third, that political parties and the OBPR require RISs to document consideration 
and adopted solutions to any potential issues that may be perceived as arising around 
rent seeking. In the case of the Australian superannuation industry, given the size and 
power of the Financial Services Sector, consideration of this variable should be included 
in RIS processes particularly around potential rent seeking activities that impose costs 
on fund members.  
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Included within this point should be the prioritisation of the completion of 
outstanding Post Implementation Reviews (PIR). 170  Ensuring reviews conducted 
around superannuation revisit legislation that may have previously been exempted 
through grants of exemption ‘carve outs’ would be meritorious and, going forward, 
should align with standards arising out of recommendation four below.  
Fourth, there is a need for the ongoing development of more rigorous statistical 
parameters for both the related costs and benefits of any proposed regulations, as 
suggested by Posner and Weyl.171  
Fifth, there is the desirability of significantly restricting the carve-out and exemption 
provisions that are included within the Australian Government Regulation Impact 
Assessment process, as flagged in the 2012 Borthwick and Milliner Review. Specifically, 
‘Prime Ministerial exemptions from the need to undertake a RIS should be provided 
only in genuinely “exceptional circumstances”’172 
Finally, it is suggested that the Federal government seek contribution more actively 
and formally from Australia’s highly experienced fund licensees in the early stages of 
the RIS process to ensure a ‘voice’ is given to them and, through their expertise, to those 
of the millions of fund members whose life savings are the subject matter of their 
fiduciary investment care. As the Productivity Commission’s 2012 Report so pointedly 
states: 173  
RIS documents should not be delivered to the door of executive government to inform 
decisions and then disappear. RIA processes are less about giving a single answer, and 
more about framing problems, scoping solutions and uncovering unintended 
consequences of proposed regulatory measures. A RIS should not fade from the scene once 
a regulatory decision enters parliament, but should remain an important reference point 
in political negotiations in the parliament before final decisions are taken. In short, RIA 
processes should not only better inform executive government decisions; they should also 
better inform the decisions of Australian parliaments. 
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